Peran Moderasi Tata Kelola Perusahaan Pada Pengaruh Kompensasi CEO Terhadap Audit Fees

Ariel  Zielma; Heru  Tjaraka

doi:10.33395/owner.v8i4.2342

Authors

Ariel Zielma Universitas Airlangga
Heru Tjaraka Universitas Airlangga

DOI:

10.33395/owner.v8i4.2342

Abstract

Financial statements are instruments that represent the company's assets in a structured manner and represent an assessment of the company's performance in the current year. Auditors play an important role in protecting investors' rights by detecting misstatements or fraud in the presentation of financial statements. This study aims to examine the effect of CEO compensation on audit fees and to know that corporate governance can strengthen the effect of CEO compensation on audit fees. This study uses a quantitative approach with multiple linear analysis models and secondary data sources from the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the 2016-2019 period. The sample used is 192 samples. The results of this study indicate that the CEO's compensation has no effect on the audit fee. This shows that the amount of the audit fee is not seen from the amount of compensation received by the CEO. In the moderating variable of corporate governance, there is no effect of CEO compensation moderated by the proportion of independent commissioners and audit committees on audit fees. This shows that the role of corporate governance does not also affect the fees given by the auditors for auditing services for their financial statements.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Plum-X Analityc

References

Adiguzel, H. (2013). Corporate Governance, Family Ownership and Earnings Management?: Emerging Market Evidence. Evidence, Accounting and Finance Research, 2(4).

Agnesia, & Muchamad. (2020). Pengaruh Mekanisme Corporate Governance dan Kompensasi Eksekutif Terhadap FeeAudit. Diponegoro Journal of Accounting, 9(2).

Al-Najjar, B. (2018). Corporate governance and audit features?: SMEs Evidence. Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, 25(1).

Armstrong et al. (2013). The relation between equity incentives and misreporting?: The role of risk-taking incentives. Journal of Financial Economics, 109(2).

Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Spamann, H. (2010). The wages of failure?: Executive compensation at bear stearns and Lehman 2000-2008. Yale Journal on Regulation, 27(2).

Bebchuk, L., Grinstein, Y., & Peyer, U. (2006). Lucky CEOS and Lucky Directors. Natiopnal Bureau of Economic Research, 65(6).

Bergstresser, D., & Phillipon. (2006). CEO incentives and earnings management to thresholds. CEO Incentives and Earnings Management to Thresholds, 80(3).

Bryan, D., & Mason, T. (2016). Extreme CEO Pay Cuts and Audit Fees. Advances in Accounting, 33, 1–10.

Cheng, Q., & Warfield, T. D. (2005). Equity Incentives and Earnings Management. The Accounting Review, 80(2).

Coakley, J., & Iliopoulou, S. (2006). Bidder CEO and other executive compensation in UK M&As. European Financial Management. European Financial Management.

Efendi, J., Srivastava, A., & Swanson, E. P. (2007). Why Do Corporate Managers Misstate Financial Statements?? The Role of Option Compensation and Other Factors. Journal of Financial Economics, 85(3).

El-Gammal, W. (2012). Determinants of Audit Fees?: Evidence From Lebanon. International Business Research, 5(11).

Fahlenbrach, R. (2009). Shareholder rights, boards, and CEO Compensation. Review of Finance, 13(1).

Feng, M., Ge, W., Luo, S., & Shevlin, T. (2011). Why do CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations?? . Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51(1–2).

Gabaix, X., & Landier, A. (2008). Why has CEO pay increased so much?? Quaterly Journal of Economics, 123(1).

Hay, D. (2013). Further evidence from Meta-Analysis of Audit fee research. International Journal of Auditing.

Himmelberg, C., & Hubbard, R. (2000). Incentive pay and the market for CEOs?: An Analysis of pay-for-performance sensitivity.

Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm?: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4).

John E., C., Robert W., H., & David F., L. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51, 371–406.

Juliawaty, R., & Astuti, C. D. (2019). Tata kelola, kompensasi CEO, karakteristik CEO, Accounting Irregularities dan Tax Aggressiveness. Jurnal Akuntansi Trisakti, 6(2).

Kannan, Y. H., Skantz, T. R., & Higgs, J. L. (2014). The impact of CEO and CFO equity incentives on audit scope and perceived risks as revealed through audit fess. Auditing?: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 33(2).

Kerin, P. (2003). Executive Compensation?: Getting the Mix Right. . The Asutralian Economic Review.

Mulyadi. (2002). Auditing Buku I. Salemba Empat.

Naser, K., & Nuseibeh, R. (2007). Determintants of Audit Fees?: Empirical Evidence From an Emerging Economy. International Journal of Commerce and Management, 17(3).

Priyatno, D. (2013). Analisis Korelasi, Regresi dan Multivariate dengan SPSS. Gava Media.

Robert, H. (2005). CEO and Executive Employee Compensation?: Firm Performance and CEO Influence New Zealand 1997-2002. Otago University.

Salehi, M., Tarighi, H., & Safdari, S. (2018). The relation between corporate governance mechanisms, executive compensation and audit fees: Evidence from Iran. Management Research Review, 41(8), 939–967. https://doi.org/10.1108/MRR-12-2016-0277

Shan, Y., & Walter, T. (2016). Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts. A Journal of Accounting, Finance and Business Studies, 52(4).

Sugiyono. (2014). Statistika untuk Penelitian. Alfabeta.

Vafeas, N., & Waegelein, J. F. (2007). The association betwen audit committess, compensation incentives and corporate audit fees. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 28(3).

Yermack. (1995). Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?? Journal of Financial Economics, 39(2–3).